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Modern authorization architectures using role-
based, policy-based, and even custom solutions have 
numerous flaws and challenges. A new design for 
authorization architecture is presented called the 
Abacus. This paper discusses the architecture that the 
Abacus utilizes to overcome the issues inherent in other 
proprietary and open-source authorization solutions. 
Specifically, the Abacus respects domain boundaries, is 
less complex than existing systems, and does not require 
direct connections to domain data stores.  
1. Introduction  
Said Eric Evans, “Every software program relates 
to some activity or interest of its user. That subject area 
to which the user applies the program is the domain of 
the software” [1]. Domains are areas that control a 
specific set of data for an organization, e.g. HR, 
engineering, or customer support. Domains are at the 
heart of every computer system, storing data and 
enabling the business functions of the organization. 
Every existing computer system has rules 
governing who is allowed to perform certain tasks or 
view specific data within that system, even if the rule is 
that anyone with access to the device is allowed to use 
it. These rules are called authorization policies.  
Domains use policies to safeguard the data within them.  
Numerous commercial and custom systems in the world 
today use roles and groups to control authorization, but 
these have proved to lack the fine-grained control 
needed, are prone to role explosion [2], and are often 
difficult to keep in sync with who should be allowed to 
have access [3]. In the past twenty years, several 
enterprise systems have been created to allow 
organizations to control authorization via authorization 
policies that rely on data attributes instead of roles or 
groups. While this reliance on data attributes allows for 
fine-grained authorization, one problem of many 
modern systems is the method of attribute gathering. 
For a policy to grant authorization, the system using 
the policy needs access to the attributes of the user 
requesting authorization. Many current systems get 
these attributes by directly accessing the database tables 
where the attributes are stored. While this access method 
may allow the authorization system to get the current 
value of the attribute at run-time, it poses numerous 
security and domain-boundary issues, among which are 
tight coupling of the authorization system to the 
domains, the ability for a malicious actor to utilize the 
authorization system as a pivot into production 
databases, and increased authorization latency. 
We propose that authorization gathering should not 
be a function of the authorization system, but that the 
attributes should be pushed to the authorization system 
from the source domains. In storing the attributes as they 
are pushed to the authorization system, checks for 
authorization never require external calls (which 
decreases latency), nor does the authorization system 
require direct pipes to domain data stores (increasing 
security and decreasing database load). We achieve this 
goal by reviewing current literature and commercial 
systems, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of 
current technology, and providing a case study of the 
implementation of the new system at a large U.S. 
university. 
In the past two and a half years we have created and 
implemented a new authorization system that addresses 
the issues above and becomes a faster, more secure, and 
more architecturally-sound solution than the other 
options in the authorization space. We have found that 
it is possible to completely decouple the authorization 
system from domain databases, allowing the domains to 
truly own the attributes that they own. This paper 
introduces this new solution. 
2. Background 
2.1. Identity and Access Management 
To comprehend the problem space of authorization, 
it is vital to recognize the distinction between the four 
components of Identity and Access Management 
(IAM): identity management, authentication, access 
management, and authorization. While many domain 
models conflate these components, decoupling the 
functions allows us to investigate authorization without 
focusing on the issues present in the other IAM pieces. 
According to Recordon and Reed [4], identity 
management consists of the use of identifiers and 





personally-identifiable information. An identity consists 
of a minimal amount of data, possibly including keys, 
certificates, or tokens [5], used to distinguish one user 
from another. Identity keys, such as name, address, 
membership number, exist in a system to allow humans 
to make sense of the identities stored within the system. 
Entities that may have an identity include users of the 
system, organizations, computer applications, and 
physical devices. 
The process of confirming that a person or system 
is who they profess to be is called authentication. It is 
easy in a digital world to pretend to be someone or 
something else (as evidenced by a popular cartoon, On 
the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog) [6], but 
through verification of credentials and other methods [7] 
a system can be more certain that the entity being 
communicated with is indeed who they say that they are.  
Certain attributes are maintained by the pillar of 
access management. This includes role and group 
management systems. While the aim of policy-based 
access control (PBAC) is to reduce the requirement for 
roles and groups, legacy systems often rely on roles and 
groups. Manual designations are most easily designated 
by adding them to a group or giving them a specific role. 
With authorization a user has the permission to 
perform the actions desired. Depending on the system, 
authorization is a result of arbitrary designation by the 
business, inherent from a position, or granted by 
delegation. It is herein proposed that authorization 
should be granted through policies that rely on 
attributes, with a specific architecture to enable such. 
2.2. Individual Authorization and Access 
Control Lists 
When computers were first invented, a user could 
type the command for a program and it would run. As 
systems began to allow multiple users to access them, 
authorization was required to prevent unauthorized 
access to specific data. Oft times a table with a list of 
users authorized for a specific program was kept, and if 
the user was in the table, then they could run the 
program. Sometimes an Access Control List (ACL) only 
allowed communication from specific IP addresses to 
protect access. 
While ACLs and individual authorization were 
good as an initial step, they had their problems. To begin 
with, every person or system address had to be 
individually added to the access table. This required 
manual effort on the part of the administrator, and if they 
were not in the office when a new user wanted access, 
then the new user may have to wait for hours or days 
before receiving access. This also presented a problem 
in the opposite direction: it was also common for a user 
to still have authorization when they left an organization 
because the administrator forgot to remove them from 
the list, either by oversight or from being uniformed 
about the departure. 
2.3. Roles and Groups 
The next type of authorization came in the form of 
roles and groups. A role is like a permission for a 
specific task or function, and a group was simply a 
group of people in a list. Functionally equivalent, a 
system would check if the user had a specific role or a 
was in a certain group to grant authorization to the user. 
This meant that program code could specify a role or 
group instead of looking for a certain user in a table, but 
the manual challenges of adding or removing 
roles/groups from the user remained. 
Roles and groups have been the de-facto standard 
for decades. Almost every enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) system in existence uses roles and groups to 
administer access and grant authorization to program 
functions and data.  Numerous commercial [8] and 
open-source solutions [9] have been developed to 
manage roles and groups. 
2.4. Attribute and Policy-based Systems 
While the idea for authorization systems relying on 
policies and attributes has been around for decades, the 
real effort in this area did not begin until the turn of the 
millennium. Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) 
and PBAC serve to provide an authorization decision by 
utilizing an authorization engine that is separate from 
the system that the user is attempting to access. This 
engine is commonly called the Policy Decision Point 
(PDP). Other common components of authorization 
systems include the Policy Administration Point (PAP) 
which allows domain owners to create policies, and 
Policy Information Points (PIPs) that are responsible for 
gathering attributes [10]. 
There are many advantages to using attributes and 
policies over roles and groups, to the point that research 
has been conducted to see if ABAC policies can be used 
within a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
framework [11]. The benefits of PBAC including the 
ability to know which systems use which attributes, ease 
of auditing, enabling systems to use attributes from 
other domains in their policies, and separation of 
authorization logic from business logic. It is unknown 
to the authors of any commercial systems that utilize this 
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methodology inherently, yet there are several 
companies that offer ABAC/PBAC services to 
organizations [12]–[14]. While these systems offer a 
simpler way of checking authoring and evaluating 
authorization logic, most modern architectures do not 
respect domain boundaries and suffer from inherent 
latency issues. 
2.5. Domain Authorization Through 
Authorization Policies 
A well-implemented domain consists of several 
parts: a central data store (CDS) that holds the relevant 
domain data, events that are raised as certain business 
processes occur, application programmable interfaces 
(APIs) that enable other systems to interact with the 
domain, data retrieval integration protocols (DRIP) for 
data lakes that enable metrics, and other such features. 
In an idea promoted as “Hexagonal Architecture”, 
Cockburn says that there should be no “...infiltration of 
business logic into the user interface code” [15] and that 
the APIs should make available the business functions 
of the domain. Vernon states that domain models should 
be “technology-free” [16] and not contain 
implementation-specific details. In this way “the data 
model should be subordinate” [17], meaning that the 
domain model should care about the business of the 
domain and not the data model that becomes the 
implementation of the business model.   
We support Cockburn’s assertion that domain 
business logic should be controlled from inside of the 
domain and Vernon’s statements regarding domain 
models focused on the business processes. We seek to 
expand upon these ideas with what we call General 
Moore’s Medallion, named after Brent Moore, Chief 
Solutions Architect at Brigham Young University. In 
Figure 1 we see that the core of a domain is surrounded 
by authorization policies, and these policies protect 
access to the domain components. For example, when 
an API is queried, the authorization policies for that API 
should be evaluated to see if the calling user/system is 
authorized for the data. Similarly, if an event is raised 
by the domain, policies should govern what subscribers 
are authorized by the domain to receive the event. This 
pattern should persist in all accesses to the domain. 
Using policies to govern authorization provide 
several advantages over previous authorization 
methodologies [18]. Fine-grained control is possible 
with policies, and access can be based on dynamic 
properties such as time of day, calling client system, 
user employment status, or other volatile factors—
things that are not necessarily available to ACLs or role-
based systems. 
This paper will enumerate the advantages of 
attributes and policies in authorization. It will then 
evaluate the difficulties of current implementations and 
provide solutions using a new methodology contained 
in a technology that we call the Abacus. 
 
 
Figure 1. General Moore's Medallion shows that 
authorization policies should protect every aspect 
of a domain. 
3. Issues with Existing Technologies 
While developing code to give access to a user with 
a specific role was a large step forward, decades of this 
method of authorization has revealed massive issues.  
The problems range from maintenance to authorization 
granularity to data leakage will now be enumerated and 
explained. 
3.1. Role Explosion 
Over time it was discovered that role-based systems 
suffered from role explosion [2], a phenomenon 
resulting from authorization requiring a granularity that 
is not available with roles. With attributes it is easy to 
create a policy that requires specific attribute values, but 
a system that can only check for a single role suffers 
from an issue of combinatorics. If there are three 
attributes, each with three possible values, then a total 
of sixty-three roles would need to be created to express 
every combination of these three attributes together: 
nine individual roles (one for each attribute value), plus 
another twenty-seven roles (for each combination of 
only two attribute values), plus another twenty-seven 
roles (for the possibilities of all three attributes). 
For example, a system might allow a user to access 
it if the user is a faculty member. The role of “Faculty” 
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may be given to the user, and this will enable them to 
access the said system. The problem begins when such 
a wide role is not enough; additional roles of “Tenured 
Faculty” and “Associate Faculty” might be created for 
more specific system functionality. When the 
distinction of “Research Faculty” or “Teaching Faculty” 
arises, the number of roles increases. The number of 
roles continues to grow over time, requiring 
increasingly precise niches, such as “Research Faculty 
with Federal Grant” or “Research Faculty without 
Funding”. 
Eventually, systems with roles required hundreds or 
thousands of roles to express what was going on for 
individual functions in systems. At this point, when a 
new system would be developed, instead of just finding 
a role that matched the need, the developer would just 
create a new role, to avoid spending exorbitant amounts 
of time looking through the existing roles. Similarly, 
role explosion makes maintenance completely 
untenable for an administrator of a role management 
system. With thousands of roles, it is extremely time-
consuming to find roles that match the required 
functionality of a new system, or to find which roles are 
no longer in use. 
3.2. Data Leakage 
Another problem with roles and groups is the issue 
of data leakage. If a person has the permission to view 
the roles and groups of an individual user, then they can 
learn confidential things about that user. For instance, if 
the user has a role called “Six-figure salary”, then it can 
be determined that the user makes a lot of money. If the 
group “Sexual harassment victim” is present, then 
someone can know information that should not be made 
available. Such data leakage can have extremely 
detrimental effects on individuals and on an 
organization, not to mention legal ramifications. 
3.3. Usage Invisibility 
The problem with a role/group governance system 
is the lack of knowing what other systems utilize which 
roles or groups. If Program A requires Role B, then 
Program A will ask the role manager if the current user 
has Role B in order to authorize the use for their current 
operation. While this is useful to Program A, the role 
manager has no inherent way to know that Program A 
uses Role B. This presents a massive issue when 
transitioning from old systems to new ones, as system 
administrators do not know which applications need to 
be updated. 
To illustrate this fact, one organization had the 
following experience. Years ago, the Federal 
Government of the United States changed the definition 
of part-time employee. The organization had certain 
groups that signified the description for the old part-time 
status, and they were forced to create new groups based 
on the new government definitions. There was no way 
to tell from the group database who was using which 
groups, nor was there any way to know from the LDAP 
directories that housed copies of these groups.  The only 
way to know was to look at the code for every system in 
the organization. 
The engineer tasked with this change had an idea: 
every Monday morning he would remove the old part-
time groups from the database and LDAP directories. 
He would then wait until a couple of departments had 
called to complain that their systems were no longer 
working. He would then restore the groups and spend 
the remainder of the week moving those departments to 
the new part-time groups. Come Monday morning he 
would repeat the process and work with the new callers 
to fix the groups used by their departments’ code. 
Sometimes a department would call multiple times, 
because their authorization logic was in multiple 
segments of code. It was six months before all the 
organization had been moved to the new part-time 
groups. 
From such a painful example it is easy to see the 
benefit that comes from being able to quickly query 
what systems utilize which attributes. 
4. Problems with Modern ABAC/PBAC 
Architectures 
There are numerous architectural considerations 
with modern commercial authorization system that arise 
out of the architectural model of said systems. The 
central design of these systems is to host a decision 
engine, the PDP, that is responsible for calculating an 
authorization decision for an identity. When the PDP is 
queried, the common method is for the PDP to call a PIP 
to gather the attributes in real-time from the domains 
that own the attributes. The PIPs are often “connectors” 
that go straight to the central data store (CDS) of the 
domain and directly retrieve the attribute value from a 
database table. It is this method of attribute gathering 
that causes significant issues with security, latency, and 
maintainability.  We will address several issues with the 
current methodologies before proposing our solutions in 
this section. 
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4.1. Current Authorization Flow 
For many instances, the process to get data from a 
domain begins with a user or other system that makes a 
request to the domain (see Figure 2). The domain 
verifies that the caller is approved for such data, then 
returns it.  Several modern authorization systems 
modify this by placing a Policy Enforcement Point 
(PEP) before the domain. The PEP is responsible for 
calling the Policy Decision Point (PDP) which 
calculates the authorization decision, and if approved, 
the PEP passes the calling request to the domain. The 
domain gets the data and returns it to the PEP. The PEP 
may then filter the data, based on the authorization 
policies, before returning it to the caller. Here is the 
normal flow of modern systems: 
1. A user or system requests access to a resource. 
2. The PEP takes the request, determines who/what is 
making the call, and sends a request to the PDP for 
authorization. 
3. PIPs request data from other domain stores. 
4. Attribute data is returned to the PDP. 
5. The PDP calculates the authorization and returns a 
response to the PEP. 
6. a. If the result is “Deny”, then the PEP is directed 
to return a “Not Authorized” message to the caller. 
b. If the result is “Permit”, then the request is 
forwarded to the domain. 
7. The domain checks the business rules to see if it 
should send an error or the requested resource. 
8. If the business rules check out, the domain queries 
its CDS to get the data. 
9. The CDS returns the relevant data to the domain. 
10. The domain returns the data to the PEP. 
11. The PEP may filter the data based on various 
authorization configurations. 
12. The PEP returns the authorized data to the caller. 
This model requiring a PEP has several 
disadvantages: increased cost, increased latency, 
conflated authorization and business logic, connectivity 
configuration complexity, and endpoint configuration 
complexity. 
First, the greater the number of components 
required for authorization, the greater the cost. Both the 
PEP and the PDP have a cost to install, configure, and 
run. Both must be operative for this model to work, 
requiring additional server allocation and running 
expense. 
Second, if the domain were calculating 
authorization on its own, it would only require the 
network hops to get the attributes needed for its 
decision. With a PEP in place, the number of network 
hops is reduced for authorization, only to replace it with 
four more hops: going to the PEP, going to the PDP, 
returning from the PDP to the PEP, and from the PEP 
back to the caller. Additionally, the PEP can become a 
network bottleneck if there are a significant number of 
requests going to various domains that must all be sent 
via the PEP. 
Third, since all traffic must pass through the PEP, 
the PEP must be configured to know the location of 
every system that it may stand as the guardian for. This 
requires significant operational resources to make sure 
that any change in domain location is accurately updated 
within the PEP. This places increased demand on 
DevOps teams to ensure that nothing in a domain 
change has broken the ability for extant entities to 
contact it. 
Finally, being a gatekeeper, the PEP must know 
every endpoint, protocol type, and available contact 
methods for the domains that it is protecting. Setting this 
configuration is well beyond the realm of the domain’s 
business owners and falls squarely into the hands of IT. 
By placing this burden on IT, the business owner is 
further removed from the ability to easily change things, 
should they require it. 
Figure 2. Existing authorization architecture 
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4.2. Breaking Domain Boundaries 
The core tenants of Domain-Driven Design (DDD) 
espouse that the business processes of the domain 
govern the access and use of the data within the domain. 
When any external entity connects to the CDS of a 
domain, all data governance is lost, for the domain has 
no way to mitigate access to the data. The domain itself 
should maintain the protection of data from external 
sources, making that data only available via APIs, 
events, claims, and so forth, each validating requests 
through domain-controlled policies. 
Letting users and systems connect directly to data 
stores without their domain creates a major security risk. 
The more connections that come into a database, the 
more likely it is that one of those users will be 
compromised at some point, allowing access. 
4.3. Attribute Gathering 
All retrieval of attributes in any authorization 
methodology must be fast. While there are numerous 
ways to accomplish this, each has limitations. Possible 
options include the run-time retrieval of attributes, 
caching attributes within the memory space of the 
decision engine itself, utilizing an external cache with 
complex logic to determine when to expire attributes 
and when to refresh them from the central data stores, or 
employing a persistent cache that always contains the 
full set of existing attributes. We will now evaluate each 
option to provide its drawbacks and advantages. 
It is possible to keep cached data within the 
memory space of the engine, but this requires the 
implementation of the cache code within the engine, 
adding complexity.  It also requires that the system 
running the engine use larger and larger amounts of 
memory as the number of attributes in the cache grows. 
Run-time retrieval of attributes is the best way to 
ensure that the attribute is accurate at the time of the 
request. The issues that arise in this situation are those 
of latency and domain resiliency. For the engine to 
make a request out to the domain with attributes, PIP 
must either go directly against the data source (which 
has been addressed before), or they must query an 
intermediary system. To query an API or data system 
requires additional time and configuration. If a domain 
goes down, then all authorization dependent upon the 
attributes in that domain will no longer work until the 
domain is back online. 
The problems of complexity, latency, and possible 
outages can be avoided if the system is correctly 
designed. We will present the proper architecture next. 
5. The Abacus: A New Architecture for 
Authorization 
The Abacus is a policy-based authorization 
management system (see Figure 3). It sits inside of the 
same network as the business systems and the only 
systems that are inside this network can invoke the 
Abacus. The data flow of Abacus consists of 7 steps: 
1. A user or system requests access to a resource. 
2. The domain takes the request, determines who/what 
is making the call, and sends a request to the Abacus 
for authorization. 
3. The Abacus calculates the authorization and returns 
a response to the domain. 
4.  
a. If the result is “Deny”, then the domain returns 
a “Not Authorized” message to the caller. 
b. If the result is “Permit”, then the domain 
checks the business rules to see if it should 
send an error or the requested resource. 
5. If the business rules check out, the domain queries 
its CDS, with whatever business rules it requires, to 
get the data. 
6. The CDS returns the relevant data to the domain. 
7. The domain returns the data to the caller. 
Compared to existing models, this architecture 
provides several advantages: reduced cost, decreased 
latency, separation of authorization and business logic, 
simplified connectivity configuration, simplified 
endpoint configuration. We will expound upon these 
further in the next major section. 
As mentioned previously in this paper, existing 
authorization systems require either 1) a connection to 
domain data for run-time retrieval, or 2) that all 
information required to calculate a decision is passed in 
the request to the PDP. The Abacus solves the 
challenges presented through these methodologies by 
utilizing a persistent cache of all attributes that the 
policies need. The cache is kept current through the 
updates of the domains that own the attributes: when an 
attribute that the domain controls changes for a user, that 
change is then pushed to the Abacus via a simple API. 
5.1. Defining Policies 
All PBAC systems define policies, as does the 
Abacus, but the method at which those policies are 
combined to define authorization for resources differs.  
While other systems require an administrator to define a 
resource, then define the actions available to a resource, 
the Abacus simplifies this process into one step: a policy 
set is defined as an action on a resource. By so doing, 
the policy set becomes technology-agnostic. Many 
systems today promote REST methods for web 
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contexts. Should a new protocol come around, all of the 
existing systems will need to change, but the Abacus can 
continue unhindered. 
For example, an authorization system may define 
resource A as an HTTPS endpoint representing certain 
records for the domain, and then it configures GET, 
POST, and DELETE methods. If a user invokes the 
GET method to view records, the PDP will evaluate the 
policy set for that method on that resource.  But if in the 
future the technology moves away from REST, then the 
whole of this configuration must be redone.   
In contrast, the Abacus would define a policy set of 
“ViewResourceA”, and then the calling API can 
interpret the technology that it uses (which may be a 
GET method) to request “ViewResourceA”.  In the 
future, if the domain changes to a new technology 
(which does not use “GET”), the action on the resource 
does not change, and the domain still calls for 
“ViewResourceA”, no matter how the technology of the 
API is administered. This forward-compatible 
architecture further decouples authorization from the 
domains. 
5.2. Persistent Cache 
The most efficient way to return information from 
a data store is to keep that data in memory. Thus, the 
most effective model for attribute retrieval involves the 
use of a persistent cache, one that never expires rows 
and contains a complete copy of all attributes needed for 
authorization policies. This Attribute Cache is located 
as close to the decision engine as possible to reduce the 
latency between the two. It has the advantage in 
providing the engine with all available attributes as 
needed—even if the domain that owns a set of required 
attributes goes off-line. In this way, authorization can 
continue even as domains are serviced for maintenance 
or become inaccessible in unforeseen instances. 
Only attributes that exist should be placed in the 
cache, to wit, only attributes that will cause a policy to 
evaluate to “true”. For instance, if a policy requires that 
the user be an employee to access a specific resource, 
then the system should only store the employee attribute 
for those that work for the organization. There may be 
thousands, or millions, of other IDs within the system 
that the Attribute Cache contains attributes for who are 
not employees: clients, customers, devices, etc. 
Restricting the cache to contain only attributes that exist 
for an ID allows for data reduction in the cache size by 
orders of magnitude. Another added benefit is 
simplification of the decision engine logic: if an 
attribute is not present in the cache for an ID, then that 
entity does not have the attribute and processing will 
respond appropriately. 
5.3. Attribute Database 
While a cache is excellent for performant data 
retrieval during decision requests, it does not provide a 
permanent store for the collection of attributes known to 
the system. It is possible to replicate the cache database, 
but there are not many tools (if any) for this. By design, 
the cache is kept with as little information within it to 
make it lightweight and fast. No data about who or what 
added the attribute, when it occurred, or what the 
definition of the attribute even is, exists in the cache. 
There must be Attribute Database to maintain the master 
record of the attributes stored in the engine which keeps 
these points of data. 
The Attribute Database should contain the expected 
items for attributes, such as the attribute type, value, and 
the ID that has the attribute, but it should also maintain 
the ID of the user or system that added the attribute, 
Figure 3. The Abacus 
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timestamp of when the attribute was added, and other 
such things that are too bulky to be stored in the 
Attribute Cache. 
A persistent store of all known attributes provides 
several advantages to the decision engine, though it 
never directly interacts with the engine. When a new 
Attribute Cache is initialized, it can pull the list of 
attributes from the Attribute Database and be operative 
in a matter of seconds. This also enables the 
administrators to remove all data from the cache and 
quickly restore the full record if there are ever concerns 
about data integrity. Backup and recovery of the 
Attribute Database is easy with tools that exist for 
whatever platform the organization chooses to work 
with. 
5.4. Attribute Updates 
When using a cache that does not expire rows, the 
natural question of data integrity arises. What happens 
when an attribute changes in a domain? There must be a 
system that allows attributes in the cache to be modified. 
For the Abacus, we take the complexity of cache 
ejections, refreshes, and so forth away from the cache 
and put it in the hands of the domain, where it rightly 
belongs. The system has an API that allows domains to 
push attributes changes (that they control) into the 
Abacus. Since the domain alone knows when an 
attribute within it changes, and the domain knows the 
components of data that make up said attribute, then the 
domain can easily call the Attribute Update API in the 
Abacus to add or delete an attribute for a user. 
The method of updating attribute in the Abacus can 
be accomplished in several ways. We suggest that the 
best solution is for the domain to raise events when the 
governed attributes change, and to also write event 
consumers that translate those events into attributes that 
are then pushed to the authorization engine. By so doing, 
these attribute-updating consumers can be kept in one 
place and easily reviewed. Additionally, all the 
implementation details of the domain are abstracted 
from the consumers and code can be focused on only 
pushing attributes as they are defined by the business 
logic. Should any of the underlying infrastructure of the 
domain change, be it database, API code, or otherwise, 
the event consumer will not need to be rewritten and 
authorization updates can continue without hindrance. 
6. Advantages of the Abacus 
Having explained the architecture of the Abacus, 
we will now enumerate upon the advantages that this 
new design gives over the existing systems, and we will 
show how it solves the problems of previous 
authorization methodologies. 
6.1 Domains Define Attributes 
All business logic for a domain should be contained 
and maintained within the domain. Because the Abacus 
specifically requires the domains to push attributes into 
it, the business definition of the attribute is maintained 
by the domain itself. We suggest that all domains record 
the definitions of their attributes in a central tool so that 
any other domain within the organization can 
understand the attributes as well. 
By allowing domains to truly control their 
attributes, the authorization system no longer needs to 
completely understand the domain business in order to 
do its job. This allows the authorization administrators 
to focus on other tasks, plus it allows those from other 
domains to learn the ubiquitous language of the domain 
in question (and vice versa). 
The domain also knows best about how and what it 
should filter before returning data to a user. Removing 
the PEP allows the domain to fully perform its primary 
functions (including data filtration). Instead of requiring 
the business logic to be placed inside of the 
authorization component, this architecture allows for 
good microservice design, letting the authorization be a 
complete package in its sphere while the domain 
handles the business filtering that it understands 
inherently.  This both gives the domain control over data 
and simplifies the authorization process as well. 
6.2 Respected Domain Boundaries 
The web of interconnected, tightly-coupled 
domains goes away with the design of the Abacus.  
DDD principles are respected when only the domain has 
access to its data stores. No longer are other systems 
reaching into the domain database, and the domain is 
free to change the underlying structure as it sees fit, per 
its business needs, without the threat of breaking other 
systems. 
This massive decoupling allows each domain to 
operate effectively as a microservice. The business 
owners can define the domain logic while the 
developers can implement each component completely 
independent of other systems, and authorization can be 
provided as an external service that places no load on 
the domain itself. 
As domains push their attributes into the Abacus, 
both systems are utilizing a well-defined contract, and 
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the authorization system itself becomes a domain that 
also has its boundaries respected. 
6.3 Efficiency 
Using the domain as the PEP itself provides 
financial and chronotical advantages. If the domain 
enforces the decision of the authorization engine, it 
removes the cost of running a PEP server. Besides the 
hardware and electricity cost, there is also the reduced 
work of the professionals that would have had to 
configure the PEP. 
From a latency perspective, removing the PEP and 
PIP calls to domain stores eliminates at least six extra 
network hops. This in addition to the time spent in the 
PEP filtering data, allows the Abacus to provide a more 
efficient response. 
Additionally, because the Abacus is constructed 
with a policy grammar specifically designed for its 
architecture, it is more efficient than other systems (we 
will be writing another paper in the future to discuss this 
in depth). 
6.4 Simplified Configuration 
Modern authorization architectures often require 
specific configuration of domain endpoints, including 
endpoint address, method types, authentication tokens, 
etc. Such technical specificity means that the IT staff 
must be the ones to define the interactions with the PDP. 
By design, the Abacus only defines actions on 
resources, which removes the need for specific 
connections to other systems. This simplifies 
configuration, as the authorization engine does not need 
to have any explicit connections to other domains 
defined within it. A domain may change its endpoints, 
but since the Abacus defines its policy sets as actions on 
a resource, no reconfiguration is needed. 
6.5 Data Security 
The ability to ask the Abacus for an authorization 
decision without passing lots of data back and forth is a 
huge win for data security and privacy. As with the 
example of the bouncer at a club, instead of handing 
over all your information on your ID, just to get an 
authorization decision about your age, the bouncer can 
now ask the Abacus, which checks the necessary 
attributes and returns an authorization to the bouncer, 
who then acts based on the response. No longer do 
systems need the information from other domains, just 
to find out if the caller is authorized. A domain can make 
available sensitive attributes to the authorization domain 
and have no worries about those attributes ever being 
leaked to other systems, yet that data can still be used 
for decisions. 
As DDD is respected, a domain will have few 
connections to its CDS. This results in easier 
administration of the domain, and there are less 
concerns about access from compromised credentials as 
there are less credentials available. Security is more 
easily moderated when there are only a few people with 
manually-assigned roles or groups while policies take 
care of the majority of the cases. 
6.6 Reverse Query Functionality 
The most powerful advantage of the Attribute 
Database is the ability to run queries against it. Domain 
owners often want to know, for auditing purposes or 
otherwise, “Who has access to this resource?”  Because 
all the policies authorizing the resource are known to the 
engine, and thus the attributes needed, and since the 
Attribute Database contains the list of current resources, 
SQL statements can be constructed that query the 
Attribute Database for the IDs that have the requisite 
attributes. 
Some modern PBAC systems contain reverse query 
functionality, but some do not. Of those that do, some 
require queries to be executed directly against domain 
production databases. This has the disadvantages of 
increased load on production systems. Also, if the data 
store is not a relational database, multiple types of 
queries must be constructed and then combined to give 
a response. With the Abacus, these reverse query 
statements are executed against the Attribute Database 
which neither 1) impacts domain servers, nor 2) impacts 
the performance of the decision engine itself. 
Production domains can use any type of storage model 
that they want, and the Abacus can still quickly generate 
a list of authorized entities because the attribute storage 
is decoupled from the domains. 
7. Disadvantages of the Abacus 
The Abacus provides significant advantages over 
existing architectures, as previously presented. While 
powerful, flexible, and novel, there are some 
considerations that must be evaluated before it can be 
implemented. 
First, there is initial setup of the attributes takes 
time and effort. Domain owners must agree on the 
definition of an attribute. The technical integration work 
must then be done to push new attribute values to the 
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Abacus whenever the values change for identities in the 
system. Additionally, if domain A requires attributes 
from domain B, then the same work must be done in 
domain B to enable the policies from A to work 
properly, and this effort needs to be budgeted within B’s 
schedule. 
While not a technical challenge, the process of 
making business owners more directly responsible for 
their data governance does invoke push-back from some 
people. Traditionally, businesses will hand the policy 
requirements to IT teams and expect the work to be 
done. We have found that asking business owners to 
take ownership of the policies occasionally produces 
feelings of resentment and stubbornness where some 
feel that “that’s IT’s job”. 
The most difficult concern is data synchronization 
issues. When a message changing an attribute is dropped 
somewhere, then the Abacus may be permitting or 
denying inaccurately. One possible mitigation technique 
is to use database ETL (extract-transform-load) 
processes to verify accuracy with the source domains, 
but this breaches domain boundaries. Alternatively, an 
API could be created to allow domains to view the 
attributes that they own within the Abacus. The domains 
could then compare what the Abacus has with what they 
contain and (re)push needed changes. Future research 
should investigate this problem. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper we presented a new architecture for 
authorization that completely respects DDD principles, 
simplifies the architecture of the authorization domain, 
more effectively secures data within domains, and gives 
more control over data access to domain owners. The 
Abacus ensures that domains may change technology 
without needing to rewrite their authorization logic, and 
domains can use attributes that are governed and 
maintained by other systems without needing to know 
the implementation and/or business logic of those 
systems. Configuration becomes much easier and 
simpler than utilizing roles or groups, or even than 
systems which require implementation details of the 
domain itself.  We affirm that the Abacus is breaking 
new ground in authorization. 
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